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Abstract 
Advances in mobile computing, sensors, controls, ubiquitous networking, and other indoor automation infrastructure 
enable buildings to operate more intelligently, providing new levels of energy efficiency, safety, convenience, and 
quality of life. e sensing, aggregation, analysis, and storage of 
potentially sensitive information about room occupants. The privacy of the information manipulated by smart spaces 
quickly becomes a key barrier in realizing the full value of ambient systems and is the focus of this paper. We 
approach this challenge first by surveying current privacy definitions and mechanisms (access control, k-anonymity, 
and differential privacy) under the assumption of ambient sensors and networking found in smart spaces. We then 
identify how existing approaches are not suitable for smart spaces under major smart space privacy scenarios and 
propose adaptations with strong potential for addressing these scenarios.   
 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
 
Keywords: privacy, smart spaces, smart rooms, differential privacy, k-anonymity, access control 
1. Introduction 
Ambient systems offer many potential benefits to humans in terms of efficiency, safety, health, 
convenience, and productivity. Our recent work in this area focuses on benefits achieved by the adoption 
of intelligent a
Engineering Research Center [1]. A typical use case here is illustrated in Fig. 1a. Here we envision 
individuals in an office building in which the infrastructure smart spaces  provides services to identify 
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the location of assets (people, objects, and the like), resources (conference rooms, elevators, & lighting), 
and rules for their use and consumption. In the most basic case, we seek to turn lights off when no user is
present. In more exotic cases, we monitor user activities and predict behaviors to anticipate where
services are required (e.g., elevator arrival or light consumption to support tasks), or we quantify the
occupancy and location of certain individuals to maximize the use of conference rooms. In these and
many other related use cases, the smart space sensing, computing, and networking infrastructure needs
to detect, process, and disseminate a great deal of information about individual users. This information
can be highly personal and dangerous if exposed inappropriately or maliciously. We focus on the
challenge of mitigating the effects of the sensing and aggregation of this information in smart spaces
without jeopardizing the benefits that they promise.
We investigate three popular methods of protecting privacy and illustrate their limitations. In the 
process, major barriers to protecting privacy in smart spaces are highlighted. We also introduce an 
extension to differential privacy to make it more applicable to emerging smart spaces.
1.1. Capabilities of smart spaces
The scope of smart spaces is vast, growing daily as new applications are developed for mobile
computing platforms, such smart phones, in the context of home automation, or for vehicular networks. 
While these applications are sometimes exotic, they are also practical as concepts seeking to improve
human life. Examples include indoor positioning, thermostat control, and our main focus: lighting 
technologies. Specific innovations include color-controllable lighting units; optical sensors, such as
cameras; and visible light communications, which can re-use lighting infrastructure to provide wireless 
networking capabilities [2, 3, 4].
These technologies can be combined to create highly-automated rooms that anticipate and respond to
. For example, a smart space can find and track occupants using sensors as they
move throughout a building to automatically turn lights on near occupants to light their way and off as the
occupant passes to conserve energy. Temperature, air flow, sound volume, and other room settings can
vities. 
Additional examples are illustrated in Fig. 1a. Through such automation, smart spaces have not only the
potential to provide energy savings, but also to improve the productivity of their occupants. 
Fig. 1: (a) Highly automated smart spaces provide services to improve productivity, energy-efficiency, and health in a variety of 
situations. (b) Illustrates the interactions between different parts of a smart space. By gathering information about the smart space 
from sensors and by providing access to this information to software applications, the smart space computer controls the actuators 
in the smart space system. Occupants can interact with the smart space infrastructure through the sensors and actuators or through
mobile devices that act as user agents. Through the smart space computer, the smart space can also access resources on larger
networks, such as the cloud.
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In addition to automation, the sensing, networking, and computational capabilities of smart spaces can 
provide information services, such as providing directions for navigation, managing resources to facilitate
sharing, tracking shoppers to increase sales, interacting with utility companies through smart meters, or 
monitoring to allow nurses to remotely serve patients (telemedicine). Research into circadian rhythm
control by regulating light levels [5] also demonstrates the potential to improve health when a smart space
can identify and track individuals. This latter point is critical: realizing many of the benefits of ambient 
systems requires empowering the computing infrastructure with sensitive information about individuals.
1.2. Organization of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the problems and the desired
outcomes for smart space privacy; Section 3.1 explores using access control methods to protect privacy in
smart spaces; Section 3.2 explores applying k-anonymity to smart spaces; and Section 3.3 explores
applying differential privacy to smart spaces. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Overview of privacy problems
While smart spaces have the potential to improve quality of life for their occupants, unless everyone
who observes the smart space handle all of the data, smart spaces can also cause 
their occupants to suffer privacy breaches. Although this trust is reasonable in special cases, such as 
remote in-home medical care, in which only the patient and medical professionals, who are customarily
trusted, interact with the smart space, this assumption of trust is not appropriate in most other scenarios.
For example, in shared buildings, such as office buildings or shopping centers, occupants may not be
comfortable sharing their smart space data with each other. In these scenarios, malicious occupants can
use the smart space to gather data about other occupants that would otherwise be inaccessible. One 
example of this is illustrated in Fig. 2b, where t personal
preferences can be used to discover the presence or location of occupants.
In other cases, occupants may not entirely trust the smart space . For example, 
smart space data to maximize profit, a conflict
between to keep purchasing decisions 
from advertisers may prevent shoppers from fully trusting the shopkeeper.
Fig. 2: A smart space may inadvertently leak information in many ways. (a) Indoor positioning or occupancy data (needed for many 
smart space applications) can disclose the location, activities, and relationships of occupants. (b) Shows how personalized lighting
may disclose the pre
through a slit under the door, people outside of the room may correctly infer that Alice is inside the room.
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Additional privacy problems can arise from the software or devices that comprise the smart space. 
Like smart phone applications, while smart space software applications from third parties can provide 
desirable features, they can also contain trojan code or components that access and covertly disclose 
private information. Similarly, hardware obtained from untrusted parties can leak information. 
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to screen for such hidden threats [6].  These scenarios, already common 
in smart phone applications, are going to be problematic in ambient systems as well.  
Prior works have investigated privacy problems in smart spaces or related scenarios. While a few of 
these papers present a general solution [7], many focus on only one feature of smart spaces, such as 
protecting location privacy for a particular application [8], and do not address privacy protection broadly 
for multiple services. We seek a general framework on which to base the development of a privacy 
protection paradigm that can be applied in a large set of use cases in smart spaces. 
Among the works that do aim to provide a general solution for smart spaces, most  rely primarily on 
access control mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to data [7, 9]. Unfortunately, as we explain in 
Section 3.1, despite access control mechanisms, information can still be leaked to untrusted or partially 
trusted entities; additional privacy protection is necessary to mitigate these disclosures.  
In contrast to previous works, we seek general solutions to protect privacy even when the smart space 
must accommodate untrusted entities. This is achieved by exploring privacy mechanisms that are 
typically used to regulate third-party database access and evaluating them in the context of smart spaces.  
2.1. Smart space privacy goals 
In order to discuss privacy for smart spaces, we need a working definition of privacy. Unfortunately, 
no universal consensus exists on the definition of or requirements for privacy; instead, 
nebulous concept that is time dependent, subject to different interpretations, and is context dependent 
[10]. These characteristics make privacy difficult to achieve or to measure. Instead of evaluating privacy 
mechanisms against a universal definition, we compare their utility (whether desired applications can 
work under the restrictions of the privacy mechanisms) and the integrity of their privacy guarantees (the 
extent to which their privacy protections hold) against the other mechanisms in various smart space use 
cases.  
Each use case is a desirable smart space service implemented on the architecture illustrated in Fig. 1b. 
In this architecture, we assume that only a central computer is fully trusted and that communications to 
and from this central computer are secure against eavesdropping and tampering. Other components or 
participants (such as third-party software applications or cloud-based services) can be untrusted or 
partially trusted. These assumptions mitigate the need to fully vet each part of the smart space while 
avoiding the need to implement decentralized privacy mechanisms.   
3. Approaches to privacy 
3.1. Access control 
Privacy is often defined by an access control policy that specifies the conditions under which 
information may or may not be released. These policies consider what information is requested, who is 
requesting the information, and other contextual information. For example, the access control policy for a 
telemedicine smart space may specify that access to the 
 physician. Another, more permissive access control policy may 
allow all information to be shared or sold to advertising partners.  
According to the access control definition of privacy, a system provides or preserves privacy if and 
only if it adheres to the specified access control policy. However, the policy may not adequately reflect 
560   Jimmy C. Chau and Thomas D.C. Little /  Procedia Computer Science  19 ( 2013 )  556 – 564 
 
the expected or desired level of privacy and may still allow information to be leaked in undesirable ways. 
For example, as illustrated in Fig. 2b, an access control policy that allows a personalized lighting system 
to access occupancy information may unintentionally disclose this information to untrusted co-workers 
sharing the smart space; outsiders without direct access to protected occupancy information can still infer 
information (in this case, personalized lighting that escapes under the door).   
This example highlights two unfortunate limitations of access control.  First, the onus to anticipate 
unintended disclosures lies with the access control policy designer.  In this case, since 
designer did not anticipate that escaping light can carry occupancy information, the policy was not 
designed to prevent this disclosure.  Anticipating unintended disclosures is especially difficult in smart 
spaces due to the vast variety of data used, the large number of applications and other entities using this 
data, and the complex (and sometimes unknown) interactions that occur within smart spaces.   
Second, using strict policies to prevent undesirable disclosures can be impractical since such policies 
may disable otherwise desirable components of the smart space that inevitably share or disclose 
information. For example, a strict policy would prevent personalized lighting within an office building 
because personalized lighting would reveal occupancy information to untrusted or adversarial coworkers.  
Similarly, a strict policy would prevent smart meters from communicating to utility companies since 
potentially sensitive usage information may be inferred from these communications.   
Finally, a strict access control policy would prevent third-party applications, devices, and services 
from using smart space data, crippling third-party smart space products, since they may contain trojans or 
deviate from the specified policy in an unverifiable manner.  As a consequence, using access control to 
achieve privacy in smart spaces may hamper the development of smart space products by new, not-yet-
trusted developers.   
3.2. k-anonymity 
An alternative is k-anonymity. Unlike access control, which can only protect privacy by preventing 
data releases, k-anonymity aims to protect the identity of the person whom is the subject of the released 
information [11]. In this way, even if desirable applications disclose the k-anonymized sensitive 
information, smart space occupants remain protected by anonymity.  This also allows untrusted or 
partially trusted third-party applications, devices, and services to be integrated into the smart space 
without necessarily sacrificing privacy.  Similarly, the shopkeeper described in Section 2 can analyze her 
 
Table 1: k-anonymization is illustrated: (a) (left) a sample raw dataset and (b) the k-anonymized dataset, where k=2, are shown. 
Name Age Gender Score  Name Age Gender Score 
Alice 17 F 85 *  F 85 
Bob 23 M 70 *  M 70 
Charlie 16 M 72 *  M 72 
Dave 26 M 74 *  M 94 
Eve 15 F 61 *  F 61 
Frank 22 M 90 *  M 90 
 
k-anonymity is achieved by determining which attributes are quasi-identifiers (QIs): attributes (such as 
name, age, and location) that can be used with other sources of information to identify people. The values 
of these attributes are generalized so that they cannot specifically identify any individual; instead, any 
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anonymized record can belong to any of k people. For example, from the raw dataset shown in Table 1a, 
k-anonymization can be performed by generalizing each QI (name, age, and gender), to form Table 1b, so 
that each tuple of QIs can match at least k=2 people. As a result, an adversary who can match name, age, 
and gender to identities would still be unable to determine to whom each anonymized entry belongs. For 
example, the 5th .  
However, this generalization makes k-anonymized data less precise than data protected with just 
access control mechanisms. This reduction in precision can degrade the performance of smart space 
applications. For example, one approach to achieve (probabilistic) k-anonymity is for everyone in a smart 
space to falsely report being in being in N-1 different regions, where N is the number of regions expected 
to cover k people [12]. With this anonymized data, an energy-efficiency application that automatically 
switches lights on and off based on occupancy would not work well because lights would remain on in N-
1 out of N regions, which are falsely reported as being occupied.  
Still, despite this compromise in utility, k-anonymity is susceptible to failure in several ways [11, 13]. 
One assumption of k-anonymity is that the anonymizer can determine which attributes in the private 
dataset also appear in other datasets to determine which attributes should be treated as QIs [11]. 
Unfortunately, as admitted in reference [11], identifying all QIs is a challenging task that requires 
knowing about all external sources of information. If a QI is missed when anonymizing data, adversaries 
can use the attribute to narrow down the anonymizing set. k-anonymity is especially susceptible to this 
risk in smart spaces; due to the rich abundance of information, many attributes, and hence, potentially 
unanticipated QIs, exist.   
k-anonymity in smart spaces is further complicated because smart spaces generate multiple data 
releases over time.  Unlike privacy mechanisms for traditional databases that only need to protect a single 
snapshot of the database, smart space privacy mechanisms need to handle perpetually updating 
information (or, effectively, an ever increasing number of snapshots).  Unfortunately, if multiple data 
releases describe the same or overlapping groups of people, composition or intersection attacks may 
drastically reduce the size of the anonymizing set [13].  For example, Eve in Table 1b completely loses 
her anonymity on her 23rd birthday because her k-anonymized age transitions from  to ; since 
that transitions on  23rd birthday, an adversary that knows 
 
Intersection attacks may also be possible if separate smart space applications submit separate queries 
on the same snapshot, yielding multiple data releases.  Separate queries and multiple data releases may be 
generated if different applications and services require data to be k-anonymized in different ways.  For 
example, an indoor navigation service may prefer the anonymization method described in [12] while an 
energy-efficiency application may prefer to use larger, continuous regions instead of fake locations for 
anonymization.  By overlaying both sets of anonymized location information to find their intersection, the 
precise location of participants can be determined.   
3.3. Differential privacy 
In contrast to k-anonymity, differential privacy (DP) composes well: combining multiple differential 
privacy data releases or combining them with external sources of information does not catastrophically 
obliterate the privacy guarantees [13].  In addition, like k-anonymity, DP can work in smart spaces with 
untrusted or partially trusted components, occupants, and external services since it does not rely on the 
entities that access information to enforce its policy.   
DP aims to ensure that the probability of getting any outcome remains the same whether or not any 
individual participates; in this sense, participation does not diminish privacy since it does not significantly 
affect the result. This is achieved by randomizing and adding noise to the functions that use the dataset to 
mask the effects of individual participants. Formally, as stated in Dwork [14], a randomized function f 
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-differential privacy if for any input datasets  and  differing by no more than one entry and for 
any set of outputs ,  
 
 
outcome, thus providing greater privacy to each individual.  
However, the guarantees provided by DP inherently limit the utility of the resulting data in a smart 
space. Since the individual should not be able to cause the probability of getting any outcome to change 
by more than a factor of , which is deliberately kept near unity to protect privacy, personalization, 
such as adjusting the lighting to .  
For example, imagine that we have a dataset that tracks the presence of people in a room and their 
lighting preference. We wish to design an -DP function f, with , that uses this dataset to set the 
. , represented by an entry in the dataset, 
prefers 82 lux of neutral white lighting. Ideally, if we ignore privacy, f always sets the lights to 82 lux 
when Bob is present and to 0 lux when Bob is not present. However, since 0.1-DP requires 
, if the lights are off with 90% probability 
when nobody is in the room, then the lights cannot be 82 lux (or even on) with greater than 
 probability when Bob is in the room.  
Fortunately, smart space applications that work with large groups of people that 
personalization and can work with noisy aggregated data remain possible. For example, one potential 
application is to adjust settings, such as the temperature and lighting levels, in a large auditorium to match 
. DP can also be applied to analyze data to learn general trends that can 
provide useful insights to help optimize the smart space.  
3.3.1. Privacy budgets 
Implementations of DP, unfortunately, only allow for a limited number of queries, known as the 
privacy budget. While this limitation is acceptable for database applications (for which DP was designed), 
in which a snapshot of the database at one point in time can yield useful insights, most smart space 
applications require frequent and perpetual information updates and will not work properly with stale 
information. For example, knowing the average preference for lighting level in an auditorium five weeks 
ago is insufficient for a smart space application to determine the appropriate lighting settings now.  
In database applications, the privacy budget is intended to prevent adversaries from repeatedly 
querying a dataset to gain more certainty about the result. This attack would otherwise be possible since 
averaging several noisy estimates of one value yields a more accurate estimate of that value. Unless the 
number of queries is bounded (by the privacy budget), adversaries would be able to almost completely 
eliminate the noise by averaging, defeating the guarantees of differential privacy.  
Dwork et al. [15] present ways to implement differential privacy without limiting the number of 
updates allowed. Unfortunately, these methods require that the quer  answers monotonically approach 
a fixed bound with each changing update; this requirement ensures that the query results will eventually 
stop changing significantly and thus, stop providing any significant update. While the approaches in [15] 
are suitable for monitoring one-shot events as they happen, the approaches are not as suitable for smart 
space applications because the smart space applications will eventually stop getting useful updates.  
We propose partitioning time-varying smart space data over time, with a separate privacy budget for 
each time segment. Smart space applications require frequent updates because the needed information 
changes unpredictably over time. For example, imagine a smart space application that sets the ventilation 
airflow in an elevator to be proportional to the number of occupants. At time , there are  occupants, 
so the application learns that there are approximately  occupants, where  is the noise added to 
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the query at time .  At a later time , perhaps ten minutes later, the previous occupants have likely left 
and new occupants have arrived.  Let the number of people in the elevator at  be .  Assuming that  
and  are independent, having an estimate on  will not reveal any additional information about  and 
vice-versa. Thus, multiple differential privacy queries about unpredictably changing information, made in 
sufficiently different times cannot be used to increase certainty about any particular answer.  
This ever-growing privacy budget may be implemented by providing an hourly, daily, or other 
periodic privacy budget that may only be used to query data from the associated time period. However, 
more analysis needs to be done to determine how to implement the periodic privacy budget to achieve the 
desired  -differential privacy, especially in cases where the answers to queries at different times 
cannot be assumed to be completely independent.  
3.3.2. Interactions in the smart space 
Unfortunately, despite this adaptation and despite the compromises in utility accepted to provide more 
robust privacy guarantees than just access control or k-anonymity alone, DP may not be sufficient to 
provide an acceptable level of privacy for smart space occupants. Although DP can add enough noise to 
mask the maximum effect that any  dataset entry can have on query results, occupants in a 
smart space also have the potential to affect the entries of other people through interactions with those 
people. In the worst case, one influential individual may be able to affect the attributes of all other 
individuals. In this case, either that individual will be individually observable (through other dataset 
entries) despite DP, which results in no privacy for that individual, or enough noise to mask the effect of 
all entries in the dataset will need to be added, which renders the resulting data entirely useless. Neither 
option is desirable.  
4. Summary, discussion, and conclusion 
Future smart spaces, equipped with the means to gather, share, and use information about themselves 
and their occupants, have the potential to greatly improve quality-of-life by providing convenience, 
safety, and efficiency. However, these same capabilities also create opportunities for vast and intrusive 
privacy invasions. In an effort to mitigate these privacy problems while retaining the benefits, we 
investigate privacy-protection mechanisms in the context of these envisioned smart spaces to build a 
general smart space privacy framework.  
Unlike prior works, we assume a generalized threat model in which devices or applications that 
consume information are not fully trusted. This broader threat model is more realistic since it accounts for 
potentially untrustworthy visitors, coworkers, shop-keepers, service-providers, and other data-consumers 
that can interact with a smart space.  Furthermore, this threat model allows for a more flexible smart space 
product ecosystem, in which untrusted or partially trusted third parties can contribute to the development 
of smart spaces without sacrificing privacy.   
Unfortunately, within this threat model, existing access-control mechanisms are insufficient to prevent 
data disclosure or to protect privacy. Other privacy definitions and mechanisms, such as k-anonymity and 
differential privacy are able to provide more robust privacy guarantees by sacrificing precision, and hence 
utility, but they each have their own weaknesses when applied to smart spaces. k-anonymity can fail if 
previously unanticipated data is made available, as time passes, or if smart space components interact 
badly.   
Differential privacy provides more robust privacy guarantees and it can be adapted for certain smart 
space applications by partitioning the data to deal with privacy budget limitations.  However, it can still 
fail if occupants interact with each other (as they are likely to do since they share the smart space).  
Although none of the explored approaches preserve privacy in general-purpose smart spaces, the 
possibility of finding a suitable privacy paradigm has not been ruled out; it may still be possible, with a 
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su , to provide a satisfactory degree of privacy to the smart space 
participants without rendering the smart space useless.  
In the meantime, more specific use cases, such as remote home care, or single-application smart spaces 
can still be secured with simple privacy mechanisms such as access control and k-anonymity.  However, 
future smart space privacy research must both 
consider the important role that untrusted or 
partially trusted parties play in the smart-space ecosystem.   
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